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POLITICIZATION IN THE EU: 
BETWEEN NATIONAL POLITICS AND EU POLITICAL DYNAMICS 
 






The EU has become increasingly politicized not only at the bottom, due to polarized 
debates, divided electorates, declining mainstream parties, and rising Euroskeptic 
populism; or from the bottom up, as national politics permeates member-state leaders’ 
positions in the Council.  It has also emerged purely at the top, in the increasingly 
politically charged dynamics of interaction within and among EU actors. Such 
politicization involves struggles for power and influence that are ideational as much as 
institutional and coercive.   Current theorists of EU integration, because of their tendency 
to focus on only one or another EU actor have overlooked the EU’s politicized dynamics, 
even though their accounts, taken together, provide ample evidence of it. The article 
shows that the EU has gone from what was once metaphorically described with the 
catchphrase of ‘politics without policy’ at the national level to ‘politics against policy’ in 
more contentious areas, whereas at the EU level it has moved from ‘policy without 
politics’ to ‘politics with policy’.  The paper illustrates with the cases of the Council and 
the Commission in the Eurozone crisis. 
 
 







Although the European Union has always been political, it has become increasingly 
politicized over time, in particular since the EU’s recent series of crises.  Politicization 
here is defined as the process through which European integration has become the subject 
of public discussion, debate, and contestation.  Such discussion may concern the EU’s 
governing authority—that is, the EU’s very right to exist or its impact on national 
sovereignty and identity—as much as its governing activities—including the EU’s policy 
effectiveness, the EU’s political responsiveness to citizens’ preferences, and the EU’s 
procedural accountability, transparency, or inclusiveness.  Over time, the EU’s authority 
and/or activities have become increasingly contested, with a rapid escalation in the 
polarization of debates in the context of the EU’s recent crises (e.g., Börzel and Risse 
2018; Schimmelfennig 2018).  Such politicization manifests itself in multiple ways at the 
national and supranational levels:  at the bottom, in the increasingly divisive debates, 
divided electorates, and volatile party politics; from the bottom up, through national level 
influence on EU actors; and at the top, in the increasingly contestational nature of 
interactions of EU actors. 
 
At the national level, politicization is a complex phenomenon in which growing electoral 
divides find expression in increasingly polarized national debates, often led by populist 
challenger parties to which mainstream parties struggle to respond (Kriesi and Hutter, 
this volume; Hooghe and Marx 2009; Hix and Hoyland 2013).  This politicization at the 
bottom has many different sources, both economic and social, for which the EU has often 
been used as the scapegoat.  But there are also purely political sources of dissatisfaction 
which have to do with the dilemmas of EU governance.  Citizens elect leaders at the 
national level while policy in increasing numbers of areas is made at the supranational 
level, where the familiar left-right politics appears displaced by technocratic decision-
making (Schmidt 2006; Mair 2013).  Citizens’ feelings that they have little voice let 
alone vote on matters of concern in an EU seen as largely technocratic is metaphorically 
captured by Schmidt’s (2006) catchphrases characterizing the national level as consisting 
of ‘politics without policy’ in EU-dominated policy areas while the supranational level is 
‘policy without politics.’   
 
But such catchphrases at best describe impressions of the period before the EU’s 
cascading series of crises, which generated an exponential increase in populist 
challengers against a background of declining trust in EU and national governing 
authority along with rising dissatisfaction with their governing activities (Kriesi 2014; 
Hobolt 2015). The Europeanization of national policies has also led to increasing 
politicization of the EU as an issue for national politics (De Wilde and Zürn 2012; Hutter 
et al. 2016; Zürn, this volume).  This suggests a new catch-phase to describe such 
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national politicization, with the EU having moved from national level ‘politics without 
policy’ to ‘politics against policy’ in the most contested domains—or even to ‘politics 
against polity’ in the most extreme cases, notably with the UK voting to exit the EU. 
 
Politicization has not remained solely at the bottom, however.  It has also had bottom up 
effects at the supranational level.  In the European Council we see the growing influence 
of national politics on member-state leaders’ positions (e.g., Schimmelfennig 2015; 
Hodson and Puetter 2019), in the European Parliament, the election of extremist parties 
(Treib 2014; Hix and Høyland 2013).  Among supranational actors, the bottom up 
pressures from national politicization may be more diffuse, but the Commission, the ECB, 
and the growing array of regulatory bodies have all become keenly aware of the political 
importance of public perceptions of their actions and the need to address them (e.g., 
Hartlapp et al., 2014: 229-230). 
 
Politicization is not just at the bottom or bottom up.  It is equally at the top, in the 
increasingly politicized interrelationships of major EU-level actors—Council, 
Commission, European Central Bank, and European Parliament. These interrelationships 
involve struggles for power and influence that, although long present, have sharpened in 
the recent crises, with hard bargaining more pronounced (Schimmelfennig 2015), 
productive consensus more difficult to achieve (Hodson and Puetter 2018).  Such power 
struggles are ideational, regarding which political-economic ideas about what to do 
prevail, as much as institutional, involving which actor gets to do what, and coercive, 
concerning who imposes the costs of the decision on whom (Carstensen and Schmidt 
2017).  Battles are fought not just over who is in charge of decision-making but also over 
who acts with legitimate authority, which policies are legitimate, and on what grounds 
(Crum and Curtin 2015; Schmidt 2018).  Such battles are manifest in the increasingly 
intense internal debates over what to do and who should decide.  But those debates now 
also increasingly spill out from the corridors of power into the public sphere, as 
policymakers address not only fellow policymakers but also European citizens more 
generally as they seek to explain and legitimate their actions (Schmidt 2018; Carstensen 
and Schmidt 2018).  
 
The combination of politicization from the bottom up and at the top suggests yet another 
update of Schmidt’s (2006) catchphrase.  The EU’s seeming ‘policy without politics’ at 
the supranational level has now been replaced by ‘policy with politics’ in the EU’s more 
contentious areas.  The presence of politicization, it should be said, is not a new 
phenomenon, since this kind of politics has always been present in the EU.  Cases in 
point include power struggles between the Council and the Commission—one of the 
earliest most famously being the ‘empty chair’ crisis of 1966—and the clash of ideas 
about how to govern the EU economy (Brunnermeier et al., 2016), which EU actors have 
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long sought to defuse through strategies of depoliticization (Fawcett and Marsh 2014; 
Zürn, this volume). But today politics has become more pronounced at every level, as 
increasing politicization at the bottom along with bottom up political pressures on EU 
actors are now joined by the much greater politicization of the dynamics of interaction 
among all EU institutional actors.  
 
This article considers all levels of EU politicization, but focuses on the dynamics of EU 
level politicization at the top in order to fill a gap in the EU studies literature.  That 
literature has been more concerned with politics in the member-states, on its effects on 
member-state leaders’ decisions in the Council, and even on individual EU institutional 
actors on their own rather than on the increasingly politicized interrelationships among 
such actors.   But, as this article will show, EU integration theorists’ very own 
perspectives on the different individual EU actors, once juxtaposed, provide the basis for 
the argument that the EU level has developed a more complicated political dynamics of 
interaction, in which all EU actors are engaged in struggles for power and authority as 
well as legitimacy for their EU governing activities.  The article begins with brief 
discussions of politicization at the bottom and its bottom up manifestations.  It 
subsequently turns to politicization at the top, which the article then illustrates with the 
cases of the Council and the Commission in the Eurozone crisis.  The conclusion raises 
the question of whether such politicization is a good thing or a bad thing for the EU as a 
whole. 
 
POLITICIZATION AT THE BOTTOM:  FROM POLITICS WITHOUT POLICY TO POLITICS 
AGAINST POLICY 
 
At the national level, the concept of politicization can be used to describe four 
interrelated phenomena:  1) the increasing political salience of the EU in national public 
spheres; 2) the growing cross-cutting cleavages in the electorate that find expression in 
public debates; 3) the mainstream party politics that has had difficulty coping with the 
electoral divides, as evidenced in election losses and weak public discourse; and 4) the 
rise of populist challenger parties and governments that benefit from the electoral divides 
and mainstream parties’ weaknesses as they give voice to the discontent.   These various 
manifestations of politicization reflect the growing polarization of views on the EU in 
terms of its authority and its activities, with increasingly intense debates manifest not 
only within national public spheres but also between them, via multiple refracted debates 
(Kriesi et al., 2012).  
 
The causes of such politicization are many, with sources in socio-economic and socio-
cultural concerns as much as purely political ones.  The socio-economic sources of 
politicization include anger at policies seen to have created rising inequalities, with many 
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people ‘left behind’ by globalization and Europeanization (e.g., Rodrik 2018).  The socio-
cultural sources encompass worries about loss of social status (e.g., Gidron and Hall 
2017) and/or about the changing ‘faces’ of the nation as a result of migration.  In all of 
this, the EU has gained increasing salience in public debates, in particular as a scapegoat.  
The EU’s recent crises have only added fuel to the fire, with North-South divisions in 
national electorates in the Eurozone crisis, East-West in the migration crisis (Börzel and 
Risse 2017; Hutter and Kriesi, this volume).  
 
These issues are at the basis of long growing divisions within and between national 
electorates.  Even before the exacerbations due to the EU’s various crises, analysts 
worried about the emergence of new cleavages between citizens whose vision of Europe 
is more open, universalist, liberal and cosmopolitan and those with more closed, 
communitarian, xenophobic and nationalist (or even EU-regionalist) orientations 
(Hooghe and Marks 2009, 2019; Kriesi et al. 2012; Zürn, this volume).  The result is that 
today the EU suffers from increasingly significant crosscutting cleavages in which newer 
identity-related divisions have only added to the traditional political divisions based on 
adherence to right/left political parties. 
 
The sources of politicization are not just grounded in how the economic and social 
sources of discontent feed into new electoral cleavages, however.   They are also political.  
The problem for national governments, as Mair (2013) has put it, is that they have been 
torn between being responsive to citizens, by fulfilling their electoral promises, and 
acting responsibly by adhering to supranational commitments. The pressures to be 
responsible affect not only the sitting governments that agreed to the supranational 
policies but also the opposition parties that may have campaigned against the very 
policies that they will then be expected to implement when they gain office—most 
notably in the case of Greece’s Syriza government.  No wonder, therefore, that to express 
their discontent, electorates have more and more frequently voted to turn out incumbent 
governments or to vote down EU-related referenda whenever they have the chance 
(Schimmelfennig, this volume).  The rallying cry of ‘Take back control’ in the 
referendum on Britain’s exit from the EU is another expression of such political 
dissatisfaction. 
 
Increasing national political volatility is also manifested in rising Euroskepticism along 
with the dramatic changes in party alignments across Europe (Hutter and Kriesi, this 
volume).  Across Europe has come the rise of populist Euroskeptic, anti-Euro and anti-
EU parties at least since the 1990s (Kriesi 2014; Hutter et al., 2016), with the EU’s recent 
multiple crises having acted as triggers for a sea change in anti-system attitudes, as 
expressed in party elections.  Eurobarometer polls (EB 2007-2018) show that trust in 
national governments and EU governance dropped precipitously after 2007, along with 
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the positive image of the EU, as the financial crisis was followed by the Eurozone crisis 
and later the migration crisis (Hobolt 2015).  This loss of trust helps explain why populist 
parties’ anti-system messages about self-serving, corrupt elites may have resonated, as 
they have mustered growing public support for views that contest EU authority and 
activities in increasingly polarized public debates (Kriesi 2014; Hobolt 2015). 
 
Note, however, that such feelings (and the realities) of disenfranchisement are not only 
due to the EU  (e.g., de Wilde and Zürn 2012).  While Brexit was probably the summum 
of the EU’s populist revolt—at least until the Italian election of March 2018, when 
euroskeptics won a governing majority—Trump’s election in the US was fueled by very 
much the same sentiments. ‘Politics against policy’ has been a growing trend for 
advanced industrialized countries generally, and not just the EU. That discontent is in 
part a consequence of the increasing supranationalization of decision-making in an era of 
globalization (see, e.g., de Wilde and Zürn 2012; Zürn this volume).  The difference 
between most advanced industrialized countries and EU member states is that other 
countries are able to choose to accept, to contest, or even not to implement policies of 
which they (or their citizens) disapprove—as the Trump Presidency’s actions on trade 
and migration have amply illustrated.  EU member states, having given up a large 
measure of autonomy in exchange for the EU’s shared authority, cannot do this as readily, 
given the role of EU institutions in enforcing the rules through Commission oversight, 
ECJ opinions, and the national courts (S. Schmidt 2018). 
 
 
POLITICIZATION FROM THE BOTTOM UP:  EU ACTORS’ INCREASING POLICY WITH 
POLITICS 
 
Politicization at the bottom has had a major bottom up impact on all EU level actors.  It 
has first and foremost undermined the ‘permissive consensus’ that neo-functionalist 
scholars argued had allowed EU actors to deepen integration without much public 
scrutiny or concern (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970).   Since the Maastricht Treaty, 
growing public awareness of the EU has resulted in what post-functionalist scholars have 
called the ‘constraining dissensus’, as decision-making on European integration ‘entered 
the contentious world of party competition, elections, and referendums’ (Hooghe and 
Marx 2009: 7). 
 
National level politicization has in particular acted as a constraint on member-state 
leaders in the Council, who have increasingly been willing to defy the EU consensus in 
order to score points at home.  In the Council, even if partisan politics per se remains 
largely absent, the politics of nationally partisan governments has infected Council 
decisions.  Individual governments have been able to impose their preferences through 
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threatened (or actual) vetoes of impending legislation, often the case of the UK pre-Brexit, 
and through refusal to agree to and/or implement legislation, the case of populist 
governments in Central and Eastern Europe on aspects of refugee and immigration policy.  
At the same time, coalitions of member states have been able to gain agreement for their 
preferences as the result of coercive threats (e.g., Schimmelfennig 2015) or deliberative 
persuasion (Puetter 2012).  A case in point is the Eurozone, with its restrictive budgetary 
policies and structural reforms that were pushed by a Northern European alliance led by 
Germany (Blyth 2013; Schimmelfennig 2015).  
 
In the EP, bottom-up politicization has arrived first and foremost in the form of the larger 
presence of populist representatives elected in the 2009 elections, with even more in the 
2014 elections (Treib 2014).  Even though their actual presence has had minimal impact 
on EP policies (so far), it has given populists a EU platform from which to speak to their 
national constituencies.  Moreover, although the grand coalition of center-left and center-
right has so far continued to privilege the politics of the public interest, its sensitivity to 
the political concerns of the citizens has meant that it has increasingly made public 
pronouncements on the political issues of the day, such as the refugee crisis and the 
Eurozone crisis, often accompanied by scathing critiques of the Council, the ECB, and 
the Commission through hearings and in reports (Héritier et al. 2016). 
 
While supranational actors such as the Commission, the ECB, the ESM (European 
Stability Mechanism), and other regulatory agencies, have not experienced the same 
degree of politicization as the majoritarian institutions of the EU, politics has nonetheless 
had a direct but diffuse influence (generalized from across the member states).  As non-
majoritarian institutions have become ever more aware of and concerned by public 
sentiment about the EU, they have become increasingly intent on appearing responsive to 
politically salient issues so as to improve public perceptions of their legitimacy (Hartlapp 
et al., 2014: 229-230; Rauh 2016).  Concerns about national level politicization have also 
led EU officials to increasingly communicate with the public directly—to inform the 
citizens of EU actions as well as to legitimate those actions (Biegón 2013).  An early 
example of this was the Commission’s ‘Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue, and Debate,’ 
launched in 2005 following the failure of the Constitutional Treaty.  But the ECB has 
perhaps been the most effective of supranational communicators.  It honed its message 
carefully to persuade citizens and the markets alike that it was always acting within its 
mandate, even as its interpretation of that mandate shifted radically over time from a very 
narrow interpretation—as never a lender of last resort with limited possibility for 
monetary expansion (Blyth 2013)—to an increasingly expansive one—including open 
monetary transactions in 2012 and quantitative easing beginning in 2015 (Schmidt 2016). 
 
	 8	
POLITICIZATION AT THE TOP:  POLICY WITH POLITICS IN EU ACTORS’ DYNAMIC 
INTERACTIONS 
 
Politicization in the EU goes beyond these direct national linkages, having also invaded 
the inter-institutional dynamics of EU-level decision-making.  As integration has 
deepened, EU actors have become more interdependent, with long-standing relations of 
cooperation now riven in many domains by greater contestation.  Politicization comes 
through the deeper intensity of interactions among EU actors in political struggles not 
only over interest-based power and influence but also over which policy ideas are 
deemed most effective and legitimate.  Such politics ‘at the top’ is particularly manifest 
in the greater pressure from majoritarian bodies—both the Council and the EP—on non-
majoritarian institutions such as the Commission and the ECB to do their bidding. But it 
is also evident in the ways in which non-majoritarian actors respond, in some cases by 
attempting to deflect majoritarian attacks, in others by seeking to bring majoritarian 
actors onto their side.  
 
Most scholars focused on EU decision-making today address this politicization.  But their 
individualized focus means they tend to overlook the overall EU level dynamics of 
interaction.  This section seeks to redress that oversight by using scholars’ own 
theorizations of different individual EU actors to elucidate the collective dynamics of EU 
interaction.  We begin with post-functionalist theorists, but then move on to the 
intergovernmentalists, the supranationalists, and the ‘parliamentarists’. 
 
Post-functionalist scholars’ theorizations about the EU’s constraining dissensus actually 
tell us very little about EU level interactions, other than to suggest that politicization at 
the bottom leads to bottom up constraints on EU actors (Hooghe and Marx 2009).  This is 
because post-functionalism, as Hooghe and Marx (2019) themselves argue, focuses on 
EU-related national political behavior rather than on EU level institutional actors, which 
are the subject of debates between intergovernmentalists and supranationalists about 
which EU actors they deem most influential.   The main prediction of post-functionalist 
theorists is that the constraining dissensus resulting from politicization has forced EU 
member-state leaders to pay more attention to their national electorates’ preferences, to 
the detriment of deepening EU integration or positive-sum solutions (Hooghe and Marx 
2009). 
 
Traditional intergovernmentalist scholars whose approaches theorize hard bargaining or 
game-theoretic analyses of Council decision-making concur with this negative view of 
the consequences of national level politicization.  Recent illustrations focus on how such 
politicization led to the hard-bargaining games of chicken in the Greek crisis, pitting 
German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble against Greek Finance Minister Yanis 
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Varoufakis (Schimmelfennig 2015).  Scholars who add a neo-functionalist component to 
this approach make a similar point by describing the neo-functionalist dynamics of 
‘failing forward’ through which intergovernmental bargaining in the Eurozone crisis has 
led time and again to incomplete agreements and failed reforms that soon require new 
intergovernmental bargains (Jones et al., 2015) 
 
Self-described ‘new intergovernmentalist’ scholars who see consensus-seeking 
deliberation rather than hard-bargaining as the Council’s mode of governance argue 
instead that politicization has not so much constrained integration as pushed EU member 
state leaders to govern differently.  Since the Maastricht Treaty, they contend, member 
state leaders have not only decided more in the European Council but have also created 
de novo regulatory bodies outside the main EU institutions, in order to contain if not 
reduce Commission powers (Puetter 2012; Bickerton et al. 2015).  But at the same time, 
that they find the Council in a political struggle with the Commission to take back control, 
they also acknowledge that national level (bottom up) politicization has taken its toll. 
Thus, Hodson and Puetter (2019) argue that although EU member-state leaders have 
continued to deepen integration, they have done so at the risk of producing a ‘destructive 
dissensus’.  This is because consensus-seeking in the Council leads mainstream member-
state leaders to accommodate extreme right populist challenger governments to the 
detriment of EU norms and values, as in the case of Hungary in the migration crisis along 
with Poland on rule of law (at least initially).   
 
Scholars who take a supranationalist approach generally dispute (new and old) 
intergovernmentalists’ views of the Council as having won the political battle for power 
and authority.  They argue instead that although the Council may remain ‘in charge’ of 
decision-making, in particular in crisis moments, supranational EU actors have become 
more ‘in control’ in a number of domains as a result of their institutional and/or 
ideational power (Schmidt 2018). For traditional supranationalists, the Council’s 
deliberate decision to create de novo bodies so as not to increase the Commission’s 
powers simply enabled a wider range of EU supranational actors—the European Central 
Bank, the ESM, and other de novo bodies—to gain even greater institutional powers of 
enforcement than in the past, which they then could use to deepen integration via neo-
functionalist processes (Niemann and Ioannou 2015; Schmidt 2018).  Self-described 
‘new’ supranationalists further argue that these same supranational actors have ironically, 
through the exercise of ideational power, developed and proposed to intergovernmental 
leaders the policy initiatives they themselves have then been charged to enforce—
including the European Semester by the Commission and Banking Union by the ECB 
(Bauer and Becker 2014; Dehousse 2016; Epstein and Rhodes 2016).  In this latter 
instance, scholars have shown that the ECB has not only become more politically 
strategic but also more politically interactive ‘at the top,’ in particular by opening up 
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dialogue with the more powerful governments to gain tacit agreement for politically 
sensitive departures from orthodox monetary policy (Schmidt 2016)—most notably just 
prior to ECB President Draghi’s announcement that he would do ‘whatever it takes’ to 
save the euro (Spiegel 2014). 
 
Even scholars concerned with the European Parliament see it too as an increasingly 
political actor in the inter-institutional dynamics ‘at the top.’  Although no 
‘parliamentarist’ would argue that the EP is either in charge or in control in any domain, 
such scholars do point to the strategies through which MEPs have sought to gain 
increasing political influence in EU decision-making (Schmidt 2018).  Importantly, 
politics comes in through the EP’s role in co-decision processes via the ‘trilogues’ with 
Council and Commission, in which the EP has increasingly pushed its own political 
agenda (Roederer-Rynning and Greenwood, 2015; Héritier et al. 2016). But even in areas 
where the EP has had little remit, it has successfully been engaged in ‘politicization by 
stealth,’ in efforts to extend its power beyond the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty 
(Meissner and Schoeller, this volume).   Finally, the EP’s 2009 successful election push 
on the Spitzenkandidat, in which it insisted that the leader of the majority party be named 
President of the Commission, created a direct ‘political’ link between the EP and the 
Commission (Dinan 2015).  
 
Only very recently have scholars started to combine such different theoretical approaches 
in analyses of the political dynamics of interaction among EU actors.  For example, 
Börzel and Risse (2018) navigate somewhere between intergovernmentalist and post-
functionalist approaches when they contend that in the Eurozone crisis deeper integration 
was accompanied by depoliticization through rules-based governance whereas in the 
migration crisis continued politicization came with the impossibility of any 
depoliticization strategy or of integrating solutions.  Schimmelfennig (2018) instead adds 
a neo-functionalist corrective to this ‘modified post-functionalist’ approach when he 
contends that in the Euro crisis transnational interdependence (via euro membership and 
the financial markets) and supranational capacities (of the ECB and the Commission) 
overrode domestic politicization and intergovernmental conflict, neither of which existed 
in the migration crisis.  Finally, Nielsen and Smeets (2018) have argued that rather than 
constraining environment or contestation among EU actors, it is the multi-agent 
collaboration of all such actors that better explains the processes of deepening integration, 
as in the case of the creation of the EU’s banking union  
 
What comes out of this overview of the diverging theoretical approaches to EU 
governance is that all EU actors are much more engaged with one another through 
cooperative and/or contestational interactions, in political struggles for institutional 
power and ideational influence, in particular in response to recent crises.  Such 
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politicization is nowhere more in evidence than in the Eurozone crisis, most notably in 
the political dynamics of interaction between the Council and the Commission. 
 
 
POLITICALLY CHARGED GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROZONE CRISIS:  THE COUNCIL AND 
THE COMMISSION 
 
The Eurozone crisis has exacerbated the growing politicization of EU actors’ inter-
institutional dynamics, with national politicization at the bottom and its concomitant 
bottom up pressures only adding to the on-going politicization at the top. The greater 
politicization was in evidence at the inception of the crisis, producing an inadequate 
response through loan bailout programs for member-states in trouble with rules-based, 
numbers-targeting oversight of all member-states’ finances through the European 
Semester (Blyth 2013; Brunnermeier et al., 2016).  Such politicization only increased 
over time as EU actors struggled with one another over how to adapt the rules to 
changing circumstances.  This was apparent in the interactions within and between the 
Council and the Commission, as North-South divisions in the Council led to greater 
internal political contestation and more testy relations with the Commission, as it sought 




Political contestation in the Council centered on member states’ disagreements about 
which policies would produce the best outcomes in what ways while serving the best 
interests of their citizens.  At the inception of the crisis, the main contest was between 
Sarkozy and Merkel.  The two had very different political-economic visions of what to do. 
Sarkozy was imbued with France’s long-standing statist liberalism, which uses the state’s 
macroeconomic levers to stimulate growth and support individual incomes, whereas 
Merkel was sustained by Germany’s corporate liberalism, and its commitment to 
preserving the system’s fiscal balance while promoting export-led growth (Vail 2018).  
They also had very different assessments of the urgency of responding to the crisis:  
while Sarkozy had a clear idea of the risks of market panic and therefore pushed for quick 
rescue at whatever cost, Merkel resisted doing anything at all  (Bastasin 2015).  
 
Pure political calculation was clearly in play, as Merkel delayed action in the hopes that 
Greece would tighten its own belt sufficiently to calm the markets while allowing her 
party to win the Nord Rhine Westphalia elections on 9 May 2010—a gross 
miscalculation.  Her concerns were also economic and legal.  She was troubled by 
German bank exposure to Greek debt, especially after having seen how expensive the 
bailout of HRE (Hypo Real Estate) had been in the 2008 financial crisis (Bastasin 2015, 
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pp. 15-22) at the same time that she openly worried that the German Constitutional Court 
might block a Greek bailout on German constitutional grounds.  But the overriding 
considerations remained political, as she insisted that she was not about to agree to a 
‘transfer union’ that would violate her promises to her electorate as well as the legal 
prescriptions of the treaties  (Newman 2015).  
 
But once Merkel finally did agree to a rescue, with a loan bailout for Greece and a loan 
bailout mechanism for other countries at risk of contagion, she insisted in exchange on 
reinforcing the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), with austerity and structural 
reforms for countries in trouble, and the reinforcement of the Commission’s ability to 
monitor member state behavior through the European Semester. Support from a coalition 
including other Northern European countries and the UK enabled German ideas to win 
the day.  Even though Sarkozy had pushed for more positive remedies, he belatedly came 
on board, relieved that something would finally be done to ‘save the euro,’ and cognizant 
that this was also electorally useful for him with his conservative constituency in France 
(Schild 2013; Crespy and Schmidt 2014).  
 
The result was that the Franco-German duo of ‘Merkozy’ dominated for the next year and 
a half, with austerity policies and structural reform the mot d’ordre, and little public 
contestation from other member state leaders.  Whether one contends that the Franco-
German interaction constituted a directoire (Schild 2013) in which Germany 
predominated (Fabbrini 2013) or a bilateral leadership (Degner and Leuffen 2018), what 
is clear is that the partnership worked mainly because Germany was able to reconcile 
French preferences with its own (Schoeller 2018). While Germany got fiscal rigor and the 
debt brake (enshrined in the Fiscal Compact), France got an element of political 
discretion in the disciplinary measures.  Moreover, the two were largely able to make 
policy for the Eurozone as a whole, as when they agreed in October 2010 to a permanent 
bailout fund (the European Stability Mechanism) by 2013, with haircuts for bondholders. 
 
Toward the end of 2011, however, as the EU economy continued to deteriorate while 
national politics became increasingly volatile—as populist parties grew, incumbent 
governments were defeated, and weak countries fell like dominoes under market attack—
the political dynamics among member state leaders in the Council began changing.  
Mario Monti, the newly appointed ‘technical’ Prime Minister went to Brussels as well as 
to Germany to plead the case for growth; and the Socialist candidate for President of 
France, François Hollande, took up the rallying cry in his campaign in early 2012.  Once 
elected President, Hollande pushed further for growth in meetings of the European 
Council, while Monti continued his pressure.  The result was a lot more talk of growth—
in contrast to the stability discourse—although little was actually done.  Nonetheless, 
political communication had changed, most notability by the staunch supporter of 
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stability herself, Chancellor Merkel, who now talked of the importance of growth and 
stability.  And this was a message taken to heart by the Commission in its oversight 
function.   
 
Only in 2014 did the discourse change yet again.  This time, the new Italian Prime 
Minister, Matteo Renzi, came to Brussels with demands for greater flexibility in the 
application of the rules, which was echoed by Hollande.  And again, with much hesitation 
and political contestation from Merkel, flexibility was also added to the discourse, on 
condition that it remained ‘within the stability rules.’  Here too, the discourse made a 
difference.  It lent support to the Commission, which had been reinterpreting the rules 
increasingly flexibly since 2012 without admitting it, and which had been under fire for 
overstepping its authority in doing so from Northern European finance ministers in the 
Eurogroup (Schmidt 2016). 
 
By the time Emmanuel Macron became French President in 2017, the discourse had 
shifted to the question of how to complete the Eurozone’s architecture, with the missing 
elements of the banking union, a Finance Minister with a budget for investment, and 
more.  But Germany hesitated, with Merkel feeling more constrained by internal politics, 
including the rise of the AfD and challenges from the CSU on migration policy.  The 
upshot was that little progress was made on the intergovernmental front with regard to 




Politics has naturally always been present to some extent in Commission dealings with 
member states in the Council.  But it has only been since the mid 2000s that partisan 
politics has been acknowledged, with the appointment of José Manuel Barroso as 
President of the Commission because his political ‘color’ reflected that of the majority in 
the newly elected 2004 EP.  But what ‘politics’ means for the Commission has changed 
over time both within the Presidency of Manuel Barroso (2004-2014) and between it and 
that of Jean-Claude Juncker (2015-2019).  If the Barroso Commission at the onset of the 
Euro crisis was often seen as a ‘secretariat’ to the Council, by the end of Barroso’s term it 
was regarded as anything but (Fabbrini 2013).  Initially, the Commission’s discourse 
emphasized strict adherence to the stability rules, with a framing of the crisis as 
stemming from fiscal profligacy, and demanding that member-states put their houses in 
order (Warren et al., 2017).  By 2013, its practices had changed despite an unchanged 
discourse as the Commission became increasingly flexible in its judgments on the 
European Semester, by reinterpreting the rules ‘by stealth’ in order to improve 
performance (Schmidt 2016). 
 
	 14	
But however ‘political’ the Barroso Commission may have appeared to members of the 
Council, the changeover from the Barroso to the Juncker Commission constituted a 
difference in kind.  Institutional as well as discursive transformations were in evidence.  
Institutionally, Barroso was appointed in 2004 by a Council that took into account the 
political orientation of the majority. In contrast, Juncker was the choice of a Council that 
found itself unable to circumvent the EP’s clever campaign to have the Spitzenkandidat 
named as Commission President (Dinan 2015).  
 
The discourse also changed. Barroso went to great lengths to maintain the fiction of an 
apolitical Commission.  Juncker instead announced in the electoral campaign of 2014 that 
he would be a ‘political’ leader rather than a technical one, meaning political sensitivity 
to citizen’s political concerns and preferences.  The differences in the ‘political’ 
orientation of the Presidents come out clearly in their discourses.  Whereas Barroso’s 
State of the Union Addresses focused on the ‘rationality’ of EU decisions mainly in terms 
of economic outputs, Juncker’s were more politically charge, referencing democracy and 
popular sovereignty (Pansardi and Battegazzorre 2018). Moreover, intent on making sure 
that the Commission was no long seen as ‘the bad guy’ (Zeitlin and Vanhercke 2018: 
168), Juncker committed himself to socializing the European Semester while introducing 
greater flexibility, albeit with more clearly specified ‘rules’ for flexibility.  This was to 
avoid the problems that the Barroso Commission had had with regard to Council 
complaints about European Semester oversight.  Juncker also sought to push the Council 
further through innovative suggestions for the future of the EU, as in the Five Presidents’ 
report (Juncker et al. 2015).  Finally, his organizational reforms, such as making Vice-
Presidents project term leaders and strengthening the role of the Secretariat General, 
reinforced his powers in relation to an increasingly assertive European Council and a 
more autonomous European Parliament (Bürgin 2018). 
 
The Commission has naturally had to be sensitive to the Council’s authority, in particular 
since it can amend its decisions.  An example of this is when the Council stopped the 
Commission’s initiative to put the social indicators it had added to the European 
Semester on a par with the economic indicators, on the grounds that this would only add 
to the ways in which the Commission could cite them for violations—or even fine them.  
But the member-states in the Council were nonetheless “caught in their own rules,” 
because they had themselves delegated to the Commission the authority to introduce new 
indicators (Savage and Verdun 2016).   
 
The Commission’s interactions with the Council are complicated by the fact that it may 
need to take account not only of how the Council might react as a body to its decisions 
but also how individual or groups of member states may respond, which may pull in 
opposing directions.  Thus, for example, while it had to deal with French President 
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Hollande’s angry outburst against the Commission’s 2013 European Semester 
recommendations on structural reforms of the French pension system on the grounds that:  
‘The Commission has no right to dictate what we have to do’ (Le Figaro, May 29, 2013), 
it also had to pay attention to Northern European countries’ increasing opposition to 
flexibility. This came to a head in 2014, with Germany and Finland making a frontal 
attack on the Commission in an eight-page memo in which they claimed that the 
Commission used ‘a somewhat arbitrary approach’ in granting budgetary flexibility, and 
went so far as the suggest that ‘a separate pair of eyes’ was needed to ensure that the rules 
were properly applied (Financial Times 28 February, 2014).  Matters were not helped in 
2016, when Commission President Juncker quipped, when asked about (again) making 
exceptions to the rules for France, that it is:  ‘Because it is France’ (Reuters, May 31, 
2016). This, naturally, led to accusations by Northern European finance ministers in the 
Eurogroup and conservative politicians in the Council that the Commission President was 
playing politics (Der Spiegel online, June 17, 2016).  
 
In short, the Commission has to navigate very narrow ‘political straits.’  On one side they 
have member states under surveillance, seeking fiscal space for economic growth in order 
to respond to citizens’ demands while reducing their deficits and paying off their debts.  
On the other, they have member states pushing for stricter and more punitive application 
of the rules, in response to their own citizens’ worries about having to pay the debts of 
others. Note that not all of this is about national politics from the bottom up, though.  It is 
also about political-economic beliefs centered on which kinds of policies will promote 
growth, and in what order to reform.  After an initial phase of support for rules-based 
orthodoxy, the Commission has played a leading role in arguing that risk sharing and risk 
reduction should go together, rather than the former being delayed until sufficient 
progress is made with the latter.  Lines of battle are drawn not just between Northern and 
Southern European member states in the Council.  They also occur also within the 
Commission itself, with ideational battles carried out using technical charts and graphs, 
and a ‘politics of numbers’ determining which countries benefited from calculations with 
regard, say, to structural deficits or to what counts as debt for a country’s balance sheet 




Our final question is whether such politicization is a good thing or a bad thing for EU 
governance.  This question has long divided scholars.  Those concerned mainly with 
democratic legitimacy have argued that politicization is a good thing, necessary for 
European integration to be accepted by national publics (E.g., Hix and Hoyland 2013).  
Those centered on governance performance instead have seen it as a bad thing, making it 
increasingly difficult for the EU to produce effective policies because of conflicting 
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preferences, or even to agree on the benefits of the outcomes (Scharpf 1999). By now, 
however, in particular since the Eurozone crisis, the refugee crisis, and Brexit, asking 
whether politicization is a good thing or a bad thing is almost beside the point since, like 
it or not, it is a ‘thing,’ and here to stay (Hutter et al., 2016; De Wilde and Zürn 2012; 
Hooghe and Marks 2009). 
 
But if politicization is not going away, our final concern should be to analyze the 
differential effects of politicization.  This is something that cannot be answered in general 
terms, since each policy area differs as to whether EU and national-level politicization 
positively or negatively affects citizen perceptions of the EU and its legitimacy.  
 
In the Eurozone crisis, for example, if we were to focus solely on the substance of 
Eurozone debates, we could argue that the mutual accusations among EU actors are 
politically delegitimizing—leading arguably to more national EU-related ‘politics against 
policy’.  But if instead we were to pay more attention to the discursive processes through 
which such contestation takes place, we could see a glimmer of hope.   
 
EU governance, so long presented as apolitical and technocratic, as ‘policy without 
politics’, where disagreements were treated in private and deals remained behind closed 
doors, has changed.  Discussions are more politically charged among EU actors, with 
differences debated in public.  And all such actors seek to communicate so as to 
legitimate their positions directly to citizens.   Such greater EU-level public deliberation 
and debate, however contentious, is in and of itself politically legitimating.    
 
But can the EU-level’s new ‘policy with politics,’ with its more politically charged 
interactions, provide a response to national-level politicization?  Not really.  While the 
EU-level may gain in political salience and legitimacy as a result of the enhanced 
deliberation and contestation, it cannot resolve the problems of democratic 
responsiveness at the national level.  Much the contrary, so long as the negative discourse 
among EU actors persists, it may further fuel the euro-skeptic populist ‘politics against 
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